21. března, 2025 Tomáš Fošum
How has the perception of the war in Ukraine changed during these past three years? Can we say that support for the country that is facing Russian aggression is declining?
It is not that simple. There is an interesting development in time. The first half year after the commencement of the Russian invasion into Ukraine in February 2022 was marked by unprecedented support for Ukraine. It was manifested not only by the interest in the given topic, but for many experts, by an unexpected willingness to accept Ukrainian refugees. Nonetheless in the second half of 2022 the situation started to be normalised, in the sense that the biggest interest in it declined, but most importantly anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian narratives started to appear on social media. That was then combined with a difficult economic situation, where energy prices dramatically rose and generally inflation was high. The question of aid became more polarising.
On the other hand, we can’t talk about a constant decline of support for Ukraine. For example, support for Ukrainian refugees stabilised already somewhere around the end of 2022, at around 55 percent. The majority of the public remains in favour of allowing them to remain. These numbers basically do not change. In January 2025 it was 54 percent. What is changing is the support for the war effort. In the last six months alone, the share of people who say that the Czech Republic’s military aid is too big has risen from 43 percent to 47 percent. We can also see a decline of those, who think that the Czech Republic should support Ukraine until it recaptures all its lost territory. Today, only 28 percent of respondents say that. And the other 72 percent are inclined to believe that the Czech Republic should strive to end the war as soon as possible, even if that would mean, that Ukraine would lose parts of its eastern territory.
Are they not afraid, that Russia will continue further west?
Some of them truly have this concern. Almost 50 percent of people consider it very or somewhat likely, that in the event of a complete surrender of Ukraine, Russia would invade a European Union country within the next ten years. On the other hand, there is a kind of war weariness. A feeling that its economically burdensome. As well as a belief, that it would be best for both sides, if it ended as soon as possible, without considering the painful implications for Ukraine and its territorial integrity.
Does your research show who Czechs blame for starting the war? According to them, is the main culprit Russia? Or is it the west, which did not respect Russian worries about further enlargement of NATO?
However I mentioned the war weariness and climbing preferences for an early end, this definitely does not mean, that the Czech public doesn’t see Russia as the main culprit. Roughly two thirds view it as such. A larger part of the last third divides the blame equally with Russia on one side and NATO and Ukraine on the other. Only about ten to fifteen percent of Czechs outright adopt the pro-Russian narrative and says, that Russia is the victim and had to react to NATO or Ukrainian provocations with a military operation.
A comparison with some of the neighbouring countries presents itself here, for example Slovakia.
We ask in the surveys, if the public prefers, that we were part of the western block, or that we were a kind of neutral bridge between East and West, alternatively if we should lean towards the East. The neutral position prevails, with around 55 percent of people saying, that they would rather be the mentioned bridge. Slightly over 40 percent want to be part of the West, and only a small percentage would prefer eastern orientation and would want to return into the influence sphere od Russia. While in Slovakia 18 percent of the population prefers this last option, based on the survey of the institute DEKK. So, there is quite a substantial difference.
How would the 55 percent of Czechs imagine the bridge between East and West? After WW2 a similar strategy did not work out for our country.
I think that this position results from a combination of reasons. Among other things it’s a loss of confidence in the vision from the nineties, which talked about a return to the West, between western democracies. This vision is partly dying out, which could have been caused by the disappointment that the economic convergence is not occurring. And part of it, in my opinion, is a cultural value issue. There may be concerns about some of the cultural shifts in the European Union, such as being too liberal on some issues. Additionally, the topic of the green transformation, where for a large part of the public, measures brought forward under the Green New Deal relate to the fear of the economic consequences for Czechia, more than they are seen as opportunity.
So, I would say a mix of these reasons leads to the fact, that the tilt towards the west is not as strong as it used to be. On the other hand, it has not been replaced by a shift to the East. Most of the public, around two thirds, view Russia today as an enemy country. It is basically the only country, which the majority views as such. For example, China is seen as an enemy country by roughly one third of the population, the rest see it more as a competitor, even a partner, or they are unable to say, but not exactly as an enemy.
February 24. 2022, is considered a turning point in Russian-Ukrainian relations, but the war has been going on for eleven years. In 2014 Russia annexed Crimea and started the war in Donbas. How did Czechs view the situation back then? Was the support for Ukraine similarly high as it was after the Russian invasion in 2022?
However Ukrainians of course see the start of the war in 2014 and are trying to frame it as such in the international space, the perception of the Czech public really changed with the invasion in 2022, when the popularity of Russian president Vladimir Putin rapidly declined as did the popularity of Russians as a minority. Conversely, concerns rose about the possibility that Russia could go further and attack a European Union country. Equally the degree of solidarity with Ukraine dramatically rose only after 2022. The annexation of Crimea didn’t really resonate in Czech public. Only the commencement of the full-on invasion and the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees signalled to the Czech public the moment, when the war truly began. Something unexpected began to happen that turned a lot of our ideas about the world upside down. The year 2022 also triggered a massive philanthropic wave among the Czechs, which was definitely not the case in 2014.
How did the war in Ukraine project into voting preferences of the Czech political parties? How big of a role does the topic play for the supporters of the individual subjects?
That is always a difficult thing to assess, because there are so many things, that affect voting preferences. But we do know that Ukraine is no longer the number one issue in terms of electoral decision-making. That economic or other domestic issues have prevailed for a long time. On the other hand, the assessment of the government’s handling of the war in Ukraine and the arrival of Ukrainian refugees is relatively quite positive when compared to its assessment in other aspects. And this is true mainly between the voters of the ruling parties. That can play quite an important role in the situation, when a part of the voters is turning away from the ruling parties, but the issue of the war in Ukraine remains one of the few topics, where they are able to praise the government. They appreciate the handling of the arrival of refugees or the active diplomatic role, that the Czech Republic has taken upon itself on the international stage. Support of Ukraine can thus be a kind of clamp that allows the government to keep some of its support.
Can we say that for the voters of the coalition Spolu, led by prime minister Petr Fiala the war in Ukraine is a more important issue, than for example a supporter of the opposition movement ANO, headed by former prime minister Andrej Babiš?
I do not have data for that type of claim, but it is true, that supporters of both parties have very different positions towards the war. For voters of Spolu the support of Ukraine is very important. Compared to that, voters of the movement ANO have a particularly strong feeling of war fatigue and would prefer for it to quickly end. They do not consider too much what a quick end to the war would mean for Ukraine in the current situation. On the other hand, it is also true, that voters of ANO feel strong solidarity with Ukrainian migrants. They also view Russia as the culprit of the war. Unlike some other opposition entities led by the SPD, the ANO movement cannot afford to speak out against Ukraine or refugees. We can see an effort to concentrate on more domestic problems, domestic politics. Or on issues, where the position of ANO voters is more united, like for example, the criticism of the consequences of the Green New Deal or migration from non-EU regions.
How much influence does what politicians say have on voters‘ attitudes towards Russian aggression?
What politicians say, in my opinion, definitely has a great influence. For example, we had a period, when we heard many voices from the opposition saying, that the aid for Ukraine and refugees is at the expense of helping the Czech public. And that’s happening at a time, when we ourselves do not have enough resources, to deal with our economic crisis. And this framing has taken hold. We know from one survey, that the average Czech thought that the equivalent of forty percent of what is spent on old-age pensions was being spent on humanitarian benefits for Ukrainian refugees. While the reality was approximately one per cent. So, there was a very strong tendency to overestimate the costliness of our aid to refugees and Ukraine. In my opinion, these narratives were put into perspective the moment the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs began to publish information that tax collections from refugee workers had already exceeded the total humanitarian benefit. Even so, on the latest data collection from January 2025 we can see, that there still exists a strong idea, that helping cost us a lot of money and that it was at the expense of the Czech public. For a part of the public it is a settled image, of what was going on here around the support of refugees and Ukraine.
Czechia admitted per capita the biggest number of Ukrainian refugees. Many Ukrainians worked here before the war. Has the perception of people from Ukraine changed in Czechia?
That is difficult to assess, because several tendencies appeared side by side. On one hand for a part of the public, and it was mainly with the more educated people, the perception after February 2022 started getting better, which probably involved solidarity with the refugees. But on the other hand, a part of the public started to become concerned. We started hearing voices, that the ones that came earlier, came for work, but now large amounts of refugees are arriving, and we don’t know what to do with them. There were many different concerns. Someone was afraid, that refugees would take work from the Czechs, or quite the opposite, that they would abuse the welfare system. Over time, it became clear that many of the greatest fears did not materialize, as there were no dramatic excesses. In contrast a large part of the public perceives positively the integration of refugees into the work market, when all around them they see working Ukrainians. More people today are satisfied with this work integration than not. The level of fear that the arrival of refugees will have negative effects on Czech society is decreasing. But it is still true, that for a lot of people refugees represent a threat rather than an opportunity. The ratio changes with time, but the perceiving of arriving Ukrainians as a threat is still stronger.
Why is this happening?
What is manifesting here, is the conservatism and close-mindedness of Czechs, who simply perceive national and cultural heterogeneity as more of a problem. Earlier I mentioned that most people today perceive the integration of Ukrainians into the job market as successful. But when we look at linguistic and cultural integration, we get a less positive picture. We could simply say that Czechs today are no longer concerned that Ukrainians aren’t working and that they are abusing the welfare system. In my opinion, this concern has been largely diffused. But there is still the fear of how they will work with us here culturally and linguistically. And if they won’t bring here an element of conflict or something, that will upend the life that we are used to. This perception of migration of more of a source of some kinds of problems rather as a source of something interesting, new impulses, is quite typical for Czechs.
Could we not compare the success of the integration of Ukrainians into the work market to the Vietnamese success? They have an image of hardworking people here.
The Vietnamese are a very special case, where in the past 10, 15 years there has been a really big shift. Their image as a hardworking people has been here for a longer time, but additionally there was a decline of perceived rates of criminality connected with the Vietnamese minority. And they have a really great reputation nowadays, but they had to work hard for it. The Czechs are simply concerned with someone getting something for free. That is in some things almost a pathological worry, that we could help someone more, than is absolutely necessary in that moment. As soon as the person in question gets on his feet, we expect him to work at least as much as the others, or rather even more.
So, Ukrainians are going in the right direction in this, because specifically integration into the job market is very important and concerning them is viewed positively. But it can take some time, till all the fears and negative emotions, that were for a part of the public connected with the arrival of Ukrainian refugees, disappear. And that is still quite recent. People still remember information from social media, which spread fear of what the arrival of Ukrainians would mean for our welfare system, our mutual coexistence. Thankfully there are no extreme situations, no dramatic criminal acts. So, the types of things, that, when done even by single individuals, can make the situation of a minority of many hundreds of thousands more difficult.
Do Ukrainian refugees want to stay here? Children which started going to school here three years ago, now know Czech well, they’ve found friends here.
In STEM we do not do surveys amidst Ukrainians, but what you are saying is true. That in reality not only the work integration is going well, but also the linguistic. Especially for children in schools, who after three years speak Czech very well. Their parents are a bit slower in grasping the language. So, it is very likely, that a large part of them will want to stay. Good news is that the Czech public is quite ready for that. Our research shows that just over fifty percent of respondents say we should allow Ukrainians to settle in the long term. And when we ask about families, who would work here, will learn the language and will comply with Czech laws, then over eighty percent of Czechs agree that they should be able to stay here long term. So, it seems that as more and more cases such as this will start happening, there is no danger of it becoming a big issue.
Jaromír Mazák is a sociologist who focuses on issues of civic and political participation and social cohesion. At the STEM Analytical Institute, he focuses on the development of new research topics. In the past, he worked at Charles University as a researcher and university lecturer with a focus on political sociology, statistics and data analysis. He also received a PhD in sociology from the same university. He spent two trimesters as a fellow at Oxford University. Photo: Monika Hánová
Translated from Czech by Alžbeta Kovárová.
The article was written in the framework of the project Reflections of the War in Ukraine in Visegrad Countries. The project is co-financed by the governments of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia through Visegrad grants from the International Visegrad Fund. The mission of the Fund is to promote ideas of sustainable regional cooperation in Central Europe.
ROČNÍK XIV. – 1. ČÍSLO, ÚNOR 2025