05. listopadu, 2025 Péter Bori
To answer this question it is worth briefly exploring the purpose and origins of the V4. Founded in 1991 by Poland, Hungary, and former Czechoslovakia (initially as the Visegrad Declaration, later as the Visegrad Four), its main aim was to foster the transition to democracy, establish good neighbourly relations and support members in their EU and NATO integration efforts. Its founding principles promoted by the likes of József Antall, Lech Wałęsa and Václav Havel were that of liberal democracy, a commitment to rule of law, tolerance and European integration. For much of its existence, the V4 provided only modest international cooperation, its main benefits lying in cross-border cultural, educational and civil society projects. Deeper political alliances were often hindered by domestic politics and diplomatic tensions surrounding ethnic minorities.
Yet, some commentators argue that the V4 is bound by a broader, shared sense of grievance towards Western Europe, united in a victimhood narrative. Lukáš Macek in his writing on the future of the V4 points out that CEE countries often feel relegated to the peripheries of Europe, and see themselves – as Milan Kundera put it – the ‘kidnapped West’. In practice, this meant that the V4 often played an important role influencing EU policy, though primarily as a rather reactive opposition force. Indeed, the 2015 migration crisis seemingly united the bloc against EU refugee relocation quotas, emphasising sovereignty and cultural homogeneity. Though internal inconsistencies revealed a shallow ideological unity (while Hungary and Poland turned migration into a core domestic political narrative, Czechia and Slovakia approached the crisis more pragmatically, emphasising domestic labor market needs and sovereignty), the united stance cemented the image of a strong V4 bloc.
And while members of the V4 continued to clash throughout the 2010s over various issues related to the EU and rule of law, the widespread rise of illiberal politics within the bloc was predicted to spur on renewed allyship – albeit one that is based on distinctly different principles than those of the V4 founders: illiberal democracy, euroscepticism and closed borders.
Yet, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia once again revealed that the stability of the V4 alliance is highly contingent on domestic politics and foreign policy agendas. For instance, the Hungarian Fidesz government, by 2022 in its 12th consecutive years in power, continued its commitment to the illiberal project by refusing to offer direct military support, sending arms or allowing NATO members to use Hungarian territory for arms and military transport purposes. Though Orbán himself claims to be pro-peace and remain neutral for the sake of Hungary’s sovereignty and the protection of Hungarian minorities in Ukraine, most commentators perceived such politics as playing into the hands of Putin, by limiting a unified European response.
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (under Prime Minister Eduard Heger) on the other hand adopted clearly pro-Ukraine and anti-Russia positions. The three countries supplied weapons, ammunition and trained Ukrainian troops. While Hungary blocked or delayed several EU sanctions packages – arguing that sanctions hurt Europe more than Russia -, the Slovak, Czech and Polish governments supported and often pushed for stronger EU sanctions against Moscow. On the diplomatic front, President Zelenskyy was frequently invited on high-level visits and received strong public support in these countries, while Hungary mostly avoided bilateral visits.
The stark division was in many ways seen as the nail in the coffin for further V4 cooperation and the first year of the war was characterised by increased diplomatic tension and Hungary’s isolation within the block. In March 2022 Hungary cancelled a meeting of V4 defence ministers, after the Slovak, Czech and Polish defence ministers indicated their absence, citing Hungary’s close relationship to Moscow. In the same month, the Polish-Hungarian friendship day celebration was postponed, after Polish President Andrzej Duda expressed his reservations towards Hungary’s pro-Russian stance.
However, a number of bilateral agreements in war-related policies reveal that the dividing lines are perhaps less clearly defined than expected. These alignments suggest that even amid political estrangement, V4 cooperation persists where material interests – energy, trade, or agricultural protectionism – outweigh ideology. For instance, Slovakia joined Hungary in maintaining Russian gas imports and both criticised EU embargoes as harmful to national economies, eventually resulting in the two countries securing exemptions from the EU oil embargo. Similarly, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia joined forces to impose national bans on Ukrainian grain imports in an attempt to protect domestic markets against rising food price inflation.
Furthermore, the split alliance characterising the first 1.5 years of the war were further blurred after Robert Fico came back to power in 2023 and immediately reversed the pro-Ukraine policies of the previous Slovak government. Fico announced the country would not send ‘a single bullet’ to Ukraine, stopped bilateral military aid and reframed the official stance on the war as a ‘proxy conflict between Russia and the West’. The shift signaled a potential reactivation of the Budapest-Bratislava axis within the V4.
With the recent electoral success of Andrej Babiš and the potential formation of a far-right government in the Czech Republic, the prospects of renewed reconciliation through an illiberal coalition once again seems to be a possible scenario. Just a few days ago, Viktor Orbán announced his intention to form a new anti-Ukraine alliance in the EU with the Czech and Slovak governments. Drawing inspiration from the V4 resistance to the 2015 migration quotas, the Hungarian Prime Minister’s political director Balázs Orbán (unrelated) said the Ukraine-sceptic alliance ‘will come – and be more and more visible’. However, it is unlikely that Poland would join in on the coalition, as Donald Tusk continues to publicly back Ukraine through military aid, EU-NATO unity and maintaining sanctions on Russia and international accountability for war crimes.
Overall, it seems then that the primary factor shaping the survival of the Visegrad Four alliance is not so much a shared commitment to certain values, ideologies and norms, but rather the waxing and waning of the current political stances of leaders within the bloc. At its conception the group may have been guided by a belief in liberal democracy, rule of law, European integration and tolerance. Yet, when faced with the crisis of migration, the overwhelming response was that of intolerance and closed borders. When faced with Russian aggression in Ukraine, the bloc divided into two camps of opposing alliances towards Ukraine and Russia. Consistency in Hungary’s position simply correlates with the electoral consistency of its ruling regime, while in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia frequent changes in political direction influence the extent to which they can represent consistent roles in the bloc.
The war in Ukraine will certainly continue to divide the bloc and little reconciliation can be expected from that front. The real question then, is whether the V4 can break free from the shackles of realpolitik and reclaim a commitment to the moral and ideological principles that once gave credence to its conception – or whether its future will remain hostage to the shifting interests of its leaders.
The article was written in the framework of the project Reflections of the War in Ukraine in Visegrad Countries. The project is co-financed by the governments of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia through Visegrad Grants from the International Visegrad Fund. The mission of the fund is to advance ideas for sustainable regional cooperation in Central Europe.
ROČNÍK XIV. – 4. ČÍSLO, LISTOPAD 2025