04. ledna, 2026 Michal Vašečka
Those who remember the attitudes of the Slovak population and the Slovak political elite towards Ukraine might be surprised in retrospect. The attitude towards Ukraine and Ukrainians before the war was incomparable with the attitudes towards other neighbours of Slovakia, in short, Ukraine did not really exist in public opinion. Unlike other EU neighbours of Ukraine – Poland, Hungary or Romania, Ukraine and Ukrainians did not arouse great emotions. Most of the population did not know much about Ukrainians and were not particularly interested in them. People did not go to the seaside in Ukraine, or consume Ukrainian products, except perhaps for smuggled cigarettes. Ukrainians went to work in the Czech Republic significantly more often than in Slovakia, the Ukrainian mafia of the 1990s was a thing of the past and Ukrainians played hockey less successfully than Slovaks. From the point of view of Slovaks, there was nothing to be gained.
It is only now clear and already explicitly communicated by opponents of Ukraine that behind the attitudes of many in Slovakia was the systematic adoption of narratives from Russia. The attitude towards Russia is and always has been a completely different story in Slovakia, and so one part of the political and social elite began, very surprisingly for Slovakia, to adopt the position that Ukraine is an artificial state, a non-historical entity that should not even exist. It is actually only the result of the long-term influence of the West on the population that was, is and should be Russian. Slovaks mostly do not know much about the story of the so-called Polish Smuta (Time of Troubles), about the negotiations in the Bialowieza Forest in 1991, or about Ivan Franko, Stepan Bandera, or Taras Shevchenko, but they have adopted the theses of Russian propaganda more quickly.
And that this is a cognitive failure can be documented precisely by the fact that many Slovaks have adopted the attitude that Ukraine is an „artificial state“. The thesis about a non-historical country often, and not entirely without justification, appears precisely in relation to Slovakia. So why do some in Slovakia believe it is only they who can explain it; cognitive breakdowns are often difficult to explain.
Immediately after the start of the war, however, the reaction of Slovakia and the country’s inhabitants may have surprised many who know the inner world of the country’s inhabitants. Although Eduard Heger’s government did not react immediately, all parts of Slovak civil society began to organize themselves even more. The immediate assistance to refugees on the border with Ukraine and the humanitarian aid delivered to all parts of Ukraine were visible and, in some respects, surpassed similar activities of civil society structures from other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Eduard Heger’s government also responded subsequently, and although it is largely forgotten today, together with Estonia and Poland, Slovakia was among the first countries to begin delivering aid to Ukraine in the form of weapons, including those that were not thought about much in Western European countries at the time – aircraft, air defence systems and a lot of artillery shells, everything from old, pre-1989 stocks that Slovakia owned.
However, this is where the problem begins that accompanies Slovakia to this day. No matter how much the Slovak government and the civil sector did everything they could for the benefit of their neighbour under attack by Russia, they largely went against the majority public opinion. Today, this may sound obvious in times when the attitude of Poles, Czechs and many other Europeans has changed to some extent, but the Slovak people were not prepared for such strongly pro-Ukrainian and at the same time anti-Russian positions and activities, and they did not welcome them. Here, in the spring of 2022, Slovakia’s fall into authoritarianism, flirtation with Russia and transformation into a pariah of Europe begins.
The first Eurobarometer mapping the attitudes of the people of Slovakia towards Ukraine and Ukrainians (Flash Eurobarometer No. 506 from April 2022) pointed to the lack of enthusiasm in relation to Ukrainians. When asked how sympathetic respondents felt towards Ukrainians attacked by Russia, Slovakia found itself at the bottom of the EU countries, along with Bulgarians and Hungarians. Only Hungarian respondents answered “definitely agree” to a lesser extent than Slovak respondents. It was only a matter of time before the result of April 2022 would be reflected, also with the help of massive pro-Russian propaganda in Slovak social media.
Attitudes toward Ukrainians in Slovakia are not exceptional – relations with other nationalities, with the exception of Czechs, are not significantly more positive, and solidarity has long been lacking. Therefore, even the difficult situation of Ukrainians has not led to their majority acceptance. According to a February 2023 survey by the Bratislava Policy Institute, while more than half of Slovaks supported accepting Ukrainian refugees, opposition prevailed on other issues. Most were unwilling to sacrifice part of their standard of living, saw no long-term benefits in their presence, and feared a weakening of the economy and the quality of public services.
It should come as no surprise that attitudes toward Ukrainians and Russian aggression became one of the key election issues in Slovakia – both in the parliamentary elections of September 2023 and the presidential elections in March and April 2024. Analysts also agree that the topic of the war in Ukraine essentially decided these votes. In the parliamentary elections, after which Robert Fico returned to power as head of the coalition government, the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic also played a role. However, the presidential elections, won by the governing coalition’s candidate Robert Pellegrini, revolved almost exclusively around peace, peacekeepers, and so-called warmongers. Pellegrini promised not to drag Slovakia into the war. Unlike Andrej Babiš, who a year earlier in the Czech presidential elections relied on a similar rhetoric, Pellegrini succeeded.
The issue of war resonates strongly in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe. But in Slovakia, public opinion has long been vigorously shaped by Vladimir Putin’s friends and Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s enemies, and politicians are constantly adapting to the majority’s whims. This is also indicated by Globsec’s research from 2023. If we compare the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, nowhere is Ukraine perceived as the culprit for the war to such an extent as in Slovakia – 17% of the Slovak population thinks that Ukraine is responsible for the war. At the same time, nowhere is the „West“ perceived as the culprit for the war to such an extent – as many as 34 percent of the population claim this, while only 40% of respondents in Slovakia chose the option that Russia as the aggressor is to blame for the war. In Poland, for comparison, 85% of respondents identify the culprit for the war in Ukraine, while 4% perceive the West as the culprit and 3% of respondents perceive Ukraine itself as the culprit. The Czech Republic is somewhere in between – Russia is perceived as the culprit of the war by 71% of respondents, the West by 15% and Ukraine by 8%.
The question remains whether Slovakia is truly exceptional in its attitude towards Ukraine. It turns out that, despite the data provided, it is not – all the trends that we know from other countries are also present in Slovakia. However, it is visible that all these trends are more dominant in Slovakia and, unfortunately, more destructive. There are several reasons for this situation, and another of the problems of the country under the Tatras is that in many respects it does not accept its diagnosis.
The first specific feature of Slovakia is the experience of pan-Slavism in its banal and offensive form. The Russian Federation has been carrying out hostile hybrid operations against Western liberal democracies for years. However, only in some countries of Central and Eastern Europe is Russia able to successfully use pan-Slavism to undermine liberal democracy. In Slovakia, pan-Slavism manifests itself primarily in the form of romantic Slavianophilia and serves to exclude and disqualify liberal elites supporting liberal pluralism. Failure to show loyalty to Slavic origins or questioning the primordial ties between all Slavs leads to self-disqualification in the public sphere.
The second dimension is the strong authoritarianism of the inhabitants of Slovakia. All research analysing the level of authoritarianism of Slovak respondents indicates that Slovakia resembles more the countries of Eastern Europe than its Central European neighbours in the V4 grouping, where, incidentally, this level is also relatively high compared to some Western European countries.
The third factor is the significant anti-Westernism of the Slovak population, which is typical for a moderate majority of the population and has not changed significantly since 1989. Numerous studies in this regard point to a correlation between anti-minority sentiments and anti-Semitism, and the level of authoritarianism. The level of anti-Western sentiment does not change much. The now legendary analyses of Vladimír Krivý from the 1990s revealed a similar level of anti-Westernism as measured by researchers today.
In fourth place, many would probably expect the results of forty years of propaganda promoting eternal cooperation with the Soviet Union. However, this propaganda was similar throughout the Eastern Bloc, yet other post-communist countries are not as susceptible to Russian narratives. It is therefore clear that how a country remembers the period before 1989 matters. In this regard, Slovakia has had significant gaps over the past 35 years. The current collective amnesia concerning the previous era, or even among part of the population, is a consequence of the fact that the period of oppression after 1948 is scarcely recalled in films, literature, or scholarly books. The difference compared to, for example, the Czech Republic and Poland is so pronounced that one can speak of two distinct types of countries that underwent different transformations.
The last dimension is what is usually not seen from the outside – Slovak utilitarianism. The Slovak effort to survive and to join the big and strong is repeated in Slovakia as if from a large textbook. As a small nation, Slovaks have survival as their highest value and subordinate everything to it. This national meme has emerged in the last 4 years, like it did in 1939 or after 1948.
Contemporary Slovakia is thus only playing for itself and trying to be nice to the strong. The Slovak government does not block Ukraine’s potential membership in the EU, but Russia does not fundamentally refuse it either. Precisely in the spirit of Russian propaganda, Slovakia is participating in questioning the EU consensus regarding the war in Ukraine and, together with Hungary, is participating in undermining the authority of the Ukrainian leadership. The Prime Minister of Slovakia Robert Fico, from his foresight regarding the future, is creating an aura of a visionary who already knows today that Ukraine lost, Russia won, everything is more complicated, and Slovakia’s national interests are based on good relations with Russia.
But is Robert Fico a Russophile, as he is often perceived? Not entirely. He is an autocratic politician whose personality was shaped in his youth by friendship and admiration for the Soviet Union. He is naturally anti-Western, statist, economically corporatist and has long been opposed to an open society. However, in many ways he is also a typical representative of a significant part of the Slovak elite. Both Jozef Tiso and Gustáv Husák were opportunists rather than lovers of Germans or Russians. It was important, in the spirit of the national cultural code, to ensure that the nation survived. And therefore – everything is simpler. The enemies of Ukraine simply do not see it, because in their view of the world it is not important. They are wrong about everything, but that does not bother them. They have their explanations and are visibly proud of themselves. It is as if they wanted to say: „If Ukraine were to fall and the Russians came – we need to quickly pour it on them. They may only rape us, but unlike others, they will not kill us.“
First published in September 2025. Translated from Slovak by Michal Vašečka.
The article was written in the framework of the project Reflections of the War in Ukraine in Visegrad Countries. The project is co-financed by the governments of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia through Visegrad Grants from the International Visegrad Fund. The mission of the fund is to advance ideas for sustainable regional cooperation in Central Europe.
SPECIÁLNÍ ČÍSLO/SPECIAL EDITION