04. ledna, 2026 Vít Dostál
Visegrad cooperation became one of the topics of this year’s Czech election campaign and was also reflected in the new government’s program. For many reasons, however, the ideas of the incoming cabinet are illusions, which only show that the program manifesto was written, at least the part that concerns foreign policy, for a world that does not exist. During the campaign, Andrej Babiš often repeated that it was Prime Minister Petr Fiala who destroyed Visegrad by ruining relations with Slovakia and Hungary. This thesis is wrong for several reasons.
Among other things, because the Visegrad Group has in fact been in decline since 2014. At that time, it had had a very successful decade behind it. All four countries had become part of the European Union. Visegrad had managed to effectively defuse internal conflicts when it calmed the then tense relationship between Slovakia and Hungary. It was also an inspiration for the countries of the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership, both thanks to its members’ successful journey to Europe and the ability of the executives of the four states to cooperate effectively.
Last but not least, this quartet has often been at the vanguard of the European Union. Whether it was the issue of energy security, cooperation with countries further east, or other sectoral agendas, it was Visegrad that came up with innovative ideas. It can be said that in some European policies, it was Visegrad cooperation that accelerated the emancipation of member countries after their accession to the EU in terms of their integration into Brussels’ structures and mechanisms.
However, after the start of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the Visegrad consensus on the perception of security risks collapsed, only to be replaced by the false idea that the sole purpose of Visegrad was to fight against relocation quotas for asylum seekers on EU soil. It should be added that Visegrad was successful in this area for a certain period of time. However, the victories achieved came at the cost of ruining its positive image. Moreover, focusing the V4’s importance on a single issue (migration) or a single tactic (opposition to „Brussels“) led to the neglect of other agendas.
During this period Visegrad became a symbol but its actual substance weakened. Nevertheless interactions between member states resulted in Viktor Orbán’s personal involvement in Andrej Babiš’s campaign ahead of the 2021 Czech parliamentary elections and the political bromance shared between the Hungarian prime minister and his Slovak counterpart Robert Fico. Until 2023, Orbán also had an influence on some of Poland’s European policy agendas. These included, for example, opposition to the so-called principle of conditionality in negotiations on the EU’s Multi-year Financial Framework.
However, this was in fact another moment when Visegrad began to crumble. Orbán’s help to Babiš was logically disliked by Petr Fiala. The proximity of some Polish national-conservative politicians from the Law and Justice (PiS) party to Orbán led to the new Polish government, led by Donald Tusk, turning against Budapest after the elections in October 2023. This shows that when some countries began to increasingly project their so-called universal political goals onto Visegrad, the change of governments and political styles in the four countries became an obstacle for Central European cooperation.
Let’s return to Babiš’s thesis that it was Petr Fiala who caused the demise of Visegrad after taking office as prime minister in 2021. It should be noted here that despite Orbán’s persistent support for Babiš, Fiala did not initially shy away from Visegrad meetings. However, given his supporters, he could hardly show a willingness to meet regularly with Orbán and Fico when his government claimed on a daily basis that it was the only guarantee of the Czech Republic’s orientation towards the West.
The situation escalated at a press conference during the Czech presidency of the V4 in the spring of 2024, when Prime Ministers Fiala, Tusk, Fico, and Orbán argued in front of the cameras. Subsequently, given the new Slovak government coalition’s friendliness towards Russia and its strange toying with symbols of the Czechoslovak Communist Normalization period of 1970’s and 1980’s, the Czech side suspended the traditional joint meeting of the governments of both countries. This was a step that polarized the Czech political scene, with the opposition calling for the restoration of special relations with Slovakia.
The reason for the described disagreements was the rhetoric of Fico and Orbán relativizing Russian aggression against Ukraine. At that moment, it simply did not make sense for Fiala or Tusk to negotiate with them at the highest political level, thus demonstrating the weight of a political alliance that had in fact ceased to exist. However, relations did not completely break down. For example, Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský maintained them and communicated normally with his counterparts in Bratislava and Budapest. Nor does it appear that there are any fundamental issues to be resolved in Czechia-Slovakia or Czechia-Hungary relations. Diplomacy functions normally.
However, the more significant nail in the Visegrad coffin was the escalation of the Polish-Hungarian dispute. This happened after the defeat of the ruling PiS party in the Polish parliamentary elections in the fall of 2023. Some of its politicians came under the scrutiny of investigators. One of the results was the prosecution of former Deputy Minister of Justice Marcin Romanowski, who decided to flee to Hungary to escape the Polish authorities. He was granted political asylum there, and Orbán’s regime still refuses to extradite him to Poland.
This is yet another layer of disputes between the current Polish and Hungarian governments. The main issue is the differing attitudes of Budapest and Warsaw towards Russian aggression against Ukraine. However, there are also more personal layers to the dispute, as Tusk is more or less an ally of Orbán’s opponent Péter Magyar, as both belong to the European People’s Party. Péter Magyar believes that, like Tusk, he will defeat the national-conservative forces in his country.
However, there is another question about the necessity of Visegrad that goes beyond Babiš’s irritation with the Fiala government’s Central European policy. In the golden years after EU accession, Visegrad did indeed represent a common interest in many respects. On issues such as energy security or the numerous transition periods associated with accession, Visegrad served as a battering ram. Moreover, it was associated with either a positive or at least neutral image.
However, this image has faded, and after twenty years of EU membership, there are fewer automatic common issues. This is all the more true at a time when the four countries disagree on the key geopolitical event of the first quarter of the 21st century, namely Russian aggression. The V4 countries have simply become normal EU states and have some interests in common and some that differ. Visegrad solidarity no longer exists, and membership in this group does not predetermine anything.
It will simply not be possible to restore close cooperation. The main obstacle will be the fact that Poland and Hungary are not talking to each other. So if the new Czech government majority dreams of Visegrad, it can count on less than half of its population agreeing with them, given Poland’s approach. And who knows what the fate of Visegrad will be after the Hungarian parliamentary elections next spring, which Orbán’s opponent Magyar may win.
However, it should be added to this outlook that Visegrad may still have a useful role to play. Czechia, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary are not about to escape from Central Europe, and are thus condemned to interact. Ideally, this interaction would take the form of friendly relations full of cooperation. It should be noted here that, despite the problematic developments of recent years, good relations in other areas are functioning and business partnerships and interpersonal contacts at the most basic level are deepening. We should celebrate twenty years of joint EU membership not only as the unification of the western and eastern parts of Europe, but also as an unprecedented interconnection of the Central European region.
The foundations of Visegrad cooperation can play a positive role in all of this. One of these is the International Visegrad Fund, which for 25 years has been providing funding for civil society initiatives that deepen contacts in the region.
Of course, the funds are limited and cannot compete with European or even Norwegian funds. Even so, their smart targeting is bearing fruit. This is best seen in the contrast between the depth of the links between Visegrad civil society and the scarcity of such links between, for example, the Czech Republic and Austria, Poland and Lithuania, or Hungary and Slovenia. The funds provided help to connect people’s stories, thereby creating a bond between societies despite politics.
However, given current political polarization, it is questionable whether the International Visegrad Fund will be able to withstand all the various pressures. Here, too, it is possible to look for a mechanism that would mean more plurality and less dominance of a particular political direction in the priorities of this institution. The Fund’s support is distributed to entire societies, which raises the question of whether its operations should be supervised solely by foreign ministries. Nominees to a „council“ of the Fund could be sent, for example, by presidents, parliaments, regions, or municipalities. In this way, the only tangible Visegrad institution would be better protected from the pressures that ultimately brought Central European cooperation as a whole to the brink of irrelevance.
If Andrej Babiš wants to think about reviving Visegrad, he is setting himself a really big task. It will not be easy to reconcile today’s Warsaw with Budapest. However, he is more likely to use the magical „V4“ as a vehicle to promote his own political ideas about the EU. He will find partners for this in Bratislava and Budapest (perhaps temporarily), but it will likely only lead to further polarization in Central Europe, marginalization of the Czech Republic within Europe, and ultimately the decline of Visegrad. Yet innovative thinking about this stifled format is truly needed today, and the path forward could be precisely the pluralization outlined above.
First published in November 2025. Translated from Czech by Vít Dostál.
The article was written in the framework of the project Reflections of the War in Ukraine in Visegrad Countries. The project is co-financed by the governments of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia through Visegrad Grants from the International Visegrad Fund. The mission of the fund is to advance ideas for sustainable regional cooperation in Central Europe.
SPECIÁLNÍ ČÍSLO/SPECIAL EDITION