29. října, 2026 Andrzej Kozłowski
Few would have guessed that, in late August 2026, the media would provide information about Polish territorial claims to 600 hectares of Czech land. This disinformation campaign involved hacking into Polish websites, seizing control of local media portals, and publishing made-up articles regarding the Polish government’s intentions toward the Czech lands. The cyberattack on these websites was not the only component of the disinformation campaign; it also involved impersonating Czech media outlets and creating a fake domain designed to look deceptively similar to a popular and credible Czech news portal iRozhlas.
Furthermore, a fabricated diplomatic document, falsely attributed to Radosław Sikorski, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, was created using artificial intelligence. No disinformation campaign would be complete without the use of social media; in this instance, various accounts were set up to impersonate diplomats, including the Polish Ambassador in Prague and various Polish deputy ministers. These accounts were also used to call for demonstrations, for example, in Třinec in the Trans-Olza region, which were meant to implement disinformation efforts from the online world to the real one, a trend encountered with increasing frequency.
The issue used as disinformation is based on the exaggeration of a real problem, the so-called “border debt” dating back to 1958, which, in reality, does not generate tension in the Polish-Czech relations. At that time, following a border adjustment, Czechoslovakia gained more territory than it ceded; consequently, the Czech Republic still “owes” Poland approximately 368 hectares of land. This matter has been under negotiation by diplomats from both countries for years (recent proposals include settling the debt through means such as joint flood-prevention investments). The disinformation campaign transformed this routine diplomatic process into alleged “territorial claims” and a narrative of an impending conflict.
Disinformation campaigns targeting Polish-Czech relations are reminiscent of similar incidents from the past. In 2020, a demonstration against the presence of American soldiers was rumoured to be taking place in Orzysz; though, in reality, no such event had ever been planned. Three months later, the websites of local media outlets and the War Studies University were hacked, and a fabricated letter supposedly signed by the university’s rector-commandant was posted; a tactic identical to the one used in the current case.
Given the reactions from both the Czech and Polish sides, it is unlikely that such actions will yield any benefit for the perpetrators. The swift and coordinated response from the authorities of both nations also deserves praise; for example, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk shared on social media an image of two popular animated characters, the Czech “Little Mole” (Krtek) and the Polish “Little Rex” (Reksio), depicted as inseparable friends. It was quickly pointed out that Russia, which aims to sow discord among neighbours, could be behind the operation. Such efforts have been particularly intense between Ukraine and Poland, though attempts have also been made to stir up antagonism between Poles and Lithuanians.
Despite difficult episodes in the history of the Czech Republic and Poland, such as the conflict over the Trans-Olza region or the participation of Polish troops in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, there have been relatively few disinformation narratives targeting the relationship between the two countries. One recent exception arose regarding the dispute over the Turów mine (2020–2022). In Poland, a narrative was circulated claiming that the Czechs, acting on orders from Berlin, intended to cut off Poland’s electricity supply and undermine the country’s energy security. Calls to boycott Czech products emerged. In the Czech Republic, Poland was accused of presumption, arrogance, and the deliberate depletion of groundwater on the Czech side of the border. In the long run, however, this dispute did not affect bilateral relations. During the 2024 floods, some isolated narratives also emerged in Poland, suggesting that the flooding had been caused by the Czechs, who had allegedly released water from their reservoirs.
Narratives targeting the Czech Republic are neither the most popular nor the most significant in Poland. It does not change the fact that disinformation remains a serious problem and a challenge for state security institutions. In Poland, it is particularly evident in the context of anti-Ukrainian narratives, which are ubiquitous and aimed at worsening relations between Poles and Ukrainians. Given the rising number of attacks on Ukrainian citizens in Poland, it must be acknowledged that this disinformation operation has, unfortunately, succeeded. Moreover, it negatively affects public support for providing aid to Ukraine, including weaponry, and fosters a distorted perception of the war. A case in point was the drone attack in September 2025, during which some politicians even questioned the official account of events, instead echoing Russian disinformation that claimed it was a Ukrainian provocation.
It is not the only disinformation trend present in the infosphere; depending on specific needs or current events, other forms frequently emerge, such as health-related disinformation, fuelled by a growing anti-vaccination movement, or false claims regarding global warming. Both narratives are highly harmful and detrimental to public safety.
When analysing disinformation in Poland, one notable detail stands out: very little content explicitly expresses support for Russia. Given its history, Poland is unlikely to view Moscow with any sympathy, making such narratives ineffective in the country. Instead, there has been a long-standing effort to foster animosity toward the European Union, and, to a lesser extent, NATO. The latter enjoys immense support in Poland, which is why narratives attacking the Alliance prove ineffective. The EU, by contrast, is accused of the worst possible transgressions: encroaching upon Polish sovereignty, attempting to impose moral and ideological standards, or destroying the Polish economy. This is precisely how attempts are made to drive a wedge between the West and Poland.
Disinformation in the Czech Republic is rooted in pro-Russian and anti-establishment messaging, as well as rhetoric directed against Western states and structures. Following the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine, many groups, which had previously built their reach by opposing pandemic-related restrictions, seamlessly transitioned to disseminating Kremlin propaganda. A very similar pattern emerged in Poland, where Facebook pages originally named “Stop Covid” rebranded themselves as “Stop the Ukrainization of Poland.”
In the Czech Republic, much like in Poland, anti-Ukrainian narratives predominate, compounded by pro-Russian themes. The distortion of the reality of the war is currently the primary focus. Ukraine is portrayed as a completely depraved “failed state”, a corrupt puppet of the West. False claims regarding alleged crimes committed by Kyiv against its own citizens, such as organ trafficking, the existence of secret American laboratories, or the deliberate scattering of explosives in public spaces, are being widely circulated. Furthermore, there is a concerted effort to fuel hostility toward Ukrainians seeking refuge in the Czech Republic. While the situation bears a strong resemblance to the one in Poland, the emphasis is placed on somewhat different narratives.
Additionally, the Czech infosphere contains anti-government narratives that target economic security. The Czech government is frequently attacked as “incompetent” and accused of acting against the interests of its own citizens to serve the agendas of the European Union and the United States. The core message is that inflation and high energy prices are part of a deliberate plan to impoverish the Czech public, and that support for Ukraine comes exclusively at the expense of the Czech people. There are also claims intended to undermine trust in the state itself, for instance, suggestions that the national electoral system is corrupt and controlled from the outside.
A recurring theme is the loss of sovereignty to EU institutions in Brussels. These narratives are intertwined with conspiracy theories about “globalists” (such as the World Economic Forum) who are allegedly planning a drastic reduction in the global population through orchestrated pandemics or 5G networks.
Despite a recent high-profile disinformation operation targeting Polish-Czech relations, such efforts have had little impact on the information landscape, and this is unlikely to change. These attempts are simply ineffective, given the mutual affinity between the two nations and their societies, as well as the absence of contentious issues that could be exploited by actors spreading disinformation. It does not mean, however, that either country is free from the threat of disinformation or can afford to be complacent; in fact, the reality is quite the opposite. That’s why a series of measures should be taken to combat this phenomenon more effectively.
The first step is to establish consistent cooperation between the state institutions responsible for monitoring the information space and countering disinformation. On the Czech side, the appropriate entity seems to be the Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats, located within the Ministry of the Interior; in Poland, the corresponding body would be the Disinformation Analysis Centre at NASK (the Research and Academic Computer Network). Furthermore, the strategic communications units within the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs should maintain a dedicated channel for communication. Such cooperation, focused primarily on the exchange of information, is crucial. Many of the most sophisticated disinformation operations are conducted simultaneously across multiple countries, often employing similar techniques and even narratives. Frequently, such activities may be visible in one country while yet to emerge in the other, underscoring the need for closer cooperation.
A second issue concerns support for non-governmental organisations engaged in the fight against disinformation. These organisations often identify matters overlooked by government bodies and constitute a vital component of the ecosystem for countering disinformation. It would be advisable to take steps toward increasing the budget of the International Visegrad Fund and establishing within it a dedicated program focused on combating disinformation across the V4 group.
A third option should involve strengthening cooperation between the authorities of various border regions and local media outlets. This would enable a more effective response to potential disinformation campaigns targeting local communities.
Both Poland and the Czech Republic are targets of disinformation efforts that are, in many respects, similar in nature. For this reason, it is crucial to intensify collaboration between government institutions and non-governmental organisations, as well as to engage actively within the framework of the Visegrad Group.
Translated from Polish by Marta Zielińska
This article was produced as part of the “Foreign Policy of the V4 Countries in a Changing World” project. The project is co-financed by the governments of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia through Visegrad Grants from the International Visegrad Fund. The mission of the Fund is to promote ideas for sustainable regional cooperation within Central Europe.
ROČNÍK XV. – 3. ČÍSLO, ZÁŘÍ 2026